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Say the Magic Words: Establishing a 
Historically Informed Standard to 
Prevent Partisanship from Shielding 
Racial Gerrymanders from Federal 
Judicial Review 
Emily K. Dalessio* 
Abstract 
In its 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, the 
Supreme Court closed the doors of the federal courts to litigants 
claiming a violation of their constitutional rights based on 
partisan gerrymandering. In Rucho, the Court held that 
partisan gerrymandering presents a political question that falls 
outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts. However, the 
Supreme Court did not address an insidious consequence of this 
ruling: namely, that map-drawers may use partisan rationales 
to obscure what is otherwise an unconstitutional racial 
gerrymander. This Note uses North Carolina as an example of a 
state with a long history of gerrymandering—both racial and 
partisan. Over the course of the last quarter century, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down North Carolina’s 
redistricting efforts as the product of racial gerrymandering. 
Nonetheless, when the State changed its strategy, arguing that it 
based its redistricting efforts on partisan goals, the Supreme 
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mom and my sisters for supporting me both in law school and in life.  
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Court in Rucho ultimately declined to review the 
constitutionality of the map, allowing it to stand. This leaves 
voters potentially unable to challenge redistricting where, as is 
the case in North Carolina, race and political behavior are 
closely aligned and the map-drawers claim that the map was 
designed to secure partisan advantage, even if racial 
demographics were central to their considerations. In effect, 
Rucho creates a “magic words” test that incentivizes 
map-drawers to sanitize the legislative record of references to 
race, in favor of references to partisanship, in order to insulate 
redistricting plans from federal judicial review.  
This Note suggests that the Supreme Court adopt a test to 
distinguish between racial and partisan gerrymandering using 
the approach the Court took in Flowers v. Mississippi—another 
2019 decision. In Flowers, the Court placed great emphasis on 
Mississippi’s history of racial discrimination in jury selection in 
finding that the State had again violated the Equal Protection 
Clause in the case before it. Applying that logic to the issue of 
gerrymandering, this Note proposes a test that would presume 
that a challenged map from a state with a history of racial 
gerrymandering was a product of racial gerrymandering. The 
State would then face a high burden to rebut that presumption 
before the reviewing court could decide whether the case presents 
a political question under Rucho. The test this Note proposes 
would safeguard the right to vote, especially for Black and 
minority voters in states with histories of voter suppression and 
in so doing, ensure that the fundamentals of the democratic 
process are not subject to further erosion.   
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I. Introduction 
 “To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is 
that much less a citizen.”1 As such, voting rights receive special 
protections under the Fourteenth2 and Fifteenth3 Amendments 
to the Constitution, as well as under the Voting Rights Act 
(VRA).4 Despite these protections and guarantees, the right to 
vote currently stands on uneven ground.5 This is particularly 
true in states like North Carolina, where a long history of racial 
gerrymandering has morphed into a recent history of partisan 
gerrymandering,6 creating a landscape in which legislators 
 
 1. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).  
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  
 3. See id. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).  
 4. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified 
as amended at scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
 5. See John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes 
Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan 
Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 505 (2002) (indicating that a “green 
light for partisan gerrymandering” could undo the accomplishments of the 
Warren Court with regard to reapportionment).  
 6. See Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding 
plaintiff-voters stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause where they 
claimed North Carolina’s reapportionment scheme was “so irrational on its 
face that it [could] be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into 
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choose their voters rather than voters choosing their 
representatives.7  
This Note explores issues of racial and partisan 
gerrymandering in the United States, using North Carolina8 as 
a case study. In particular, this Note focuses on the actual and 
potential impacts of the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Rucho 
v. Common Cause,9 in which the Court held that partisan 
gerrymandering is a non-justiciable political question.10 This 
Note seeks to provide an answer to a question left unaddressed 
in Rucho: how can federal courts ensure that states with a long 
history of racial gerrymandering do not disguise 
 
separate voting districts because of their race”); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 
U.S. 899, 904–18 (1996) (holding that the reapportionment of voters in North 
Carolina’s District 12 violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act because the State’s classification of voters by race was 
“not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”); Hunt v. Cromartie 
(Cromartie I), 526 U.S. 541, 553–54 (1999) (finding insufficient evidence that 
North Carolina’s 1997 redistricting of District 12 was racially gerrymandered); 
Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001) (holding that 
racial considerations did not predominate the 1997 redesign of District 12); 
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82 (2017) (upholding “the District 
Court’s conclusions that racial considerations predominated in designing both 
[Congressional] District 1 and District 12”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. 
Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (finding that the North Carolina congressional 
district map was the result of partisan gerrymandering, which is not 
justiciable under the political question doctrine). 
 7. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the North Carolina partisan gerrymanders “enabled 
politicians to entrench themselves in office as against voters’ preferences”).  
 8. See Michael J. Pitts, What Has Twenty-Five Years of Racial 
Gerrymandering Doctrine Achieved?, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 229, 242 (2018) 
(indicating that North Carolina is an appropriate state to use to study racial 
gerrymandering because its “congressional districts have seen more racial 
gerrymandering litigation at the Supreme Court level than any other districts 
in the country”).  
 9. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).  
 10. See id. at 2506–07 (majority opinion) (“We conclude that partisan 
gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the 
federal courts.”). 
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unconstitutional racial gerrymandering11 as partisan 
gerrymandering in order to escape judicial review?12  
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Rucho speaks directly to what is 
at stake in instances of racial and partisan 
gerrymandering— “[gerrymandering] deprive[s] citizens of the 
most fundamental of their constitutional rights: the right to 
participate equally in the political process, to join with others to 
advance political beliefs, and to choose their political 
representatives.”13 For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of voting “as a fundamental political 
right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”14 In the absence 
of federal judicial review this essential democratic right is 
without the protections that it warrants.15  
Rucho’s holding that partisan gerrymandering is a 
non-justiciable political question16 creates an incentive for 
legislatures redrawing congressional district maps to disguise 
racial gerrymandering as partisan gerrymandering.17 
Legislators can do this by ensuring that there is little to no 
direct or circumstantial evidence in their records demonstrating 
 
 11. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463–64 (2017) (stating that 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state 
from “‘separating its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race’” 
without a compelling justification (quoting Bethune-Hills v. Va. State Bd. of 
Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017))).  
 12. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07 (concluding that partisan 
gerrymandering does not present an issue suitable for federal judicial review 
under Article III of the Constitution).  
 13. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 14. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).  
 15. See id. (stating that voting rights are among those rights “secured by 
those maxims of constitutional law” and are fundamental); Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (referring to “the rights to participate equally 
in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to 
choose their political representatives” as “the most fundamental of [citizens’] 
constitutional rights”).  
 16. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07.   
 17. See id. at 2523 n.5 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In districting cases no less 
than others, officials respond to what this Court determines the law to 
sanction.”). 
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that race was the dominant factor motivating redistricting.18 
Thus, federal courts need a standard by which to hold 
legislatures accountable when partisan motivation becomes a 
thin veil for racial motivation—particularly in states whose 
legislatures have historically played a game of trial and error 
with racial and partisan gerrymanders to gain an entrenched 
political advantage.19 This Note provides that standard. 
Specifically, this Note argues that the Court should utilize 
the same equal protection intervention it applied in another 
2019 decision: Flowers v. Mississippi.20 In Flowers, the Court 
placed great emphasis on the defendant’s historical evidence of 
racial discrimination in the context of juror selection, both with 
regard to recent patterns and long-term practice.21 Similar 
considerations of history and practice are justified with respect 
to voting rights, which have historically been the subject of deep 
racial discrimination in states like North Carolina.22 This Note 
posits that where a plaintiff bringing a gerrymandering claim 
can show a recent and long-standing history of a 
state-defendant’s impermissible use of race in drawing district 
lines, an evaluating federal court should presume that the 
gerrymandering is based on race rather than partisanship.23 
 
 18. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (indicating that even where 
some evidence of racial consideration in redistricting is present, the overall 
scheme may be constitutional); David Daley, The Secret Files of the Master of 
Modern Republican Gerrymandering, NEW YORKER (Sept. 6, 2019) 
https://perma.cc/57MU-W6VE (“[Dr. Thomas Hofeller,] known as the master 
of the modern gerrymander, trained . . . G.O.P. operatives and legislators 
nationwide to secure their computer networks, guard access to their maps, and 
never send e-mails that they didn’t want to see published by the news media.”). 
 19. See cases cited supra note 6 (evidencing North Carolina’s history of 
gerrymandering, beginning with unconstitutional racial gerrymanders, 
followed by the same districts being redrawn and upheld as seeking partisan 
advantage).  
 20. 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019). For further discussion of Flowers v. 
Mississippi, see infra Part V.  
 21. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2245 (indicating that a judge may consider a 
“wide net” of historical evidence of racial discrimination in the context of 
allegations of discriminatory peremptory strikes).  
 22. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) (noting the “long history of 
official racial discrimination in North Carolina’s political system”); see also 
infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part V.  
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The state-defendant would then have an opportunity to rebut 
the presumption of racial gerrymandering before it could move 
to dismiss based on the Rucho political question holding.24 This 
test would prevent Rucho from shielding racial gerrymanders 
from judicial review merely because a state used partisanship 
as “magic words” to avoid scrutiny from the federal judiciary.25  
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides background 
information on redistricting law and the VRA,26 which aids in 
understanding the issues of racial and partisan gerrymandering 
addressed by the rest of this Note. Part III presents a case study 
of a quarter century of gerrymandering jurisprudence in North 
Carolina. This section explores important issues and themes 
presented in each case, which inform the analysis in Parts IV 
and V.27 Part IV discusses the Supreme Court’s majority and 
dissenting opinions in Rucho v. Common Cause and identifies 
the problem Rucho creates in instances where partisan 
gerrymandering clearly has a strong racial component. Finally, 
Part V examines the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning in 
Flowers v. Mississippi. Part V goes on to propose a solution that 
would allow the federal courts to have a continued role in 
ensuring that voting rights, which are so fundamental to our 
system of democracy, are not subject to further degradation. 
II.  Redistricting Law and the Voting Rights Act 
 This section explores the constitutional and statutory 
framework underlying the claims of racial and partisan 
gerrymandering presented in Parts III and IV of this Note. 28 An 
understanding of this background material further supports the 
workability of the solution presented in Part V.29 
 
 24. See infra Part V.   
 25. See infra Part V; see also Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238, 269 (N.C. 
2014) (Beasley, J., dissenting) (cautioning against a “magic words” test to 
determine whether gerrymandering was based on race or partisanship).  
 26. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified 
as amended at scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).  
 27. See infra Part III.  
 28. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 29. See infra Part V.  
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 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Fifteenth Amendment provide the constitutional basis 
for claims of vote dilution,30 including racial gerrymandering.31 
“[T]he concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed 
as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the 
same relation to the governmental action questioned or 
challenged.”32 This understanding of equal protection with 
regard to voting rights is drawn from the Court’s decision in 
Gray v. Sanders,33 in which the Court laid down the concept of 
“one person, one vote” (OPOV).34 When states afford individual 
votes different weights based on the geographic location of that 
voter, the state generally violates the OPOV doctrine.35  
 Supplementing the Constitution’s protections, the Voting 
Rights Act, “statutorily prohibits redistricting legislation that 
results in racial vote dilution (regardless of intent) or, in some 
jurisdictions, redistricting legislation that causes a 
retrogression in minority voters’ ability to elect their candidate 
 
 30. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2513 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (defining vote dilution as “the devaluation of one citizen’s vote as 
compared to others”).  
 31. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); Michael Parsons, 
Clearing the Political Thicket: Why Political Gerrymandering for Partisan 
Advantage Is Unconstitutional, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1107, 1113 (2016) 
(“The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits legislatures from engaging in two 
forms of racial gerrymandering: intentional racial vote dilution . . . and racial 
sorting.”).   
 32. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
 33. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).  
 34. Id. at 381.  
 35. See Wesbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that Article 
I, § 2 of the Constitution “means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote 
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”); Mahan v. 
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973) (interpreting Reynolds v. Sims as meaning 
that in states with a bicameral legislature both houses must be “apportioned 
substantially on a population basis”); Parsons, supra note 31, at 1109 
(referring to state violations of OPOV as “quantitative vote dilution”).  
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of choice.”36 Section 2 of the VRA, as amended in 1982,37 
prohibits vote dilution.38 Vote dilution occurs where minority 
voters “have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.”39  
 In Thornburg v. Gingles40 the Court construed Section 2 of 
the VRA for the first time after the 1982 amendments.41 Gingles 
primarily concerned the North Carolina General Assembly’s 
1982 redistricting plan for state legislative elections.42 Black 
voters challenged one single-member and six multi-member 
districts,43 claiming that the districting frustrated their ability 
to elect representatives of their choosing under Section 2 of the 
VRA.44  
 The crux of a claim under Section 2, according to the 
Supreme Court, is “that a certain electoral law, practice, or 
structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause 
an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [B]lack and 
 
 36. Parsons, supra note 31, at 1113; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 52 
U.S.C.); see infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.  
 37. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 
131 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).  
 38. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (“[Congress] amended § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a 
minority group’s voting strength, regardless of the legislature’s intent.”); 
Parsons, supra note 31, at 1119 (explaining that the VRA prohibits “two 
different redistricting offenses: dilution and retrogression”). 
 39. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); Parsons, supra note 31, at 1119 (describing the 
prohibitions of the VRA).  
 40. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).  
 41. Id. at 34.  
 42. See id. at 34–35, 46 (noting the plaintiffs’ allegations that “the 
legislative decision to employ multimember, rather than single-member, 
districts . . . dilutes their votes by submerging them in a white majority”). 
 43. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616–17 (1982) (defining 
multi-member districts as those that “tend to minimize the voting strength of 
minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all 
representatives of the district”). “[In these districts a] distinct [racial] 
minority . . . may be unable to elect any representative in an . . . election, yet 
may be able to elect several representatives [in corresponding single-member 
districts].” Id.  
 44. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id.   
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[W]hite voters to elect their preferred representatives.”45 For a 
claim of vote dilution through multi-member districts to be 
challenged successfully “a bloc voting majority must usually be 
able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, 
geographically insular minority group.”46 In order to make this 
showing, the minority group must demonstrate that it is large 
and compact enough to command a majority in a single-member 
district, because, if it is not, then the alleged dilution could not 
be remedied by redrawing district lines to create a 
single-member district.47 Challengers must further show that 
the minority group is “politically cohesive” and that in the 
absence of special circumstances, the white majority votes as a 
bloc, enabling majority voters to defeat a minority candidate.48 
If the challengers are able to establish that the Gingles 
requirements are met, the court will evaluate whether a 
violation of Section 2 has occurred based on the totality of the 
circumstances.49 
 States attempting to comply with Section 2 of the VRA must 
therefore examine the demographic breakdown in a particular 
region to determine “where minority groups are sufficiently 
large and geographically compact to constitute a numerical 
majority in a hypothetical district.”50 In these areas the state 
must ensure that minority voters have an equal opportunity to 
elect representatives of their choice.51  
 
 45. Id. at 47. 
 46. Id. at 49.  
 47. See id. at 50 (explaining the requirement for a sufficiently large and 
geographically compact minority group); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 
(1993) (indicating that the first Gingles factor is “needed to establish that the 
minority has the potential to elect a representative of its own choice in some 
single-member district”). 
 48. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 (providing the test for vote dilution 
violations of Section 2 of the VRA). 
 49. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2009) (“In a § 2 case, 
only when a party has established the Gingles requirements does a court 
proceed to analyze whether a violation has occurred based on the totality of 
the circumstances.”). 
 50. See Parsons, supra note 31, at 1120 (explaining the process by which 
states can comply with Section 2 of the VRA).  
 51. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (describing the type 
of conduct and voting conditions that violate Section 2 of the VRA). 
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 One districting method that, where applicable, satisfies the 
requirements of Section 2 is the creation of majority-minority 
districts.52 Majority-minority districts are those in which a 
racial minority composes a “numerical, working majority of the 
voting-age population.”53 Where racially polarized voting is 
prevalent, the creation of a majority-minority district may be 
required to ensure that minority voters retain their voting 
strength under Section 2.54 As the Court in Bartlett v. 
Strickland55 explained, “[t]he special significance, in the 
democratic process, of a majority means it is a special wrong 
when a minority group has 50 percent or more of the voting 
population and could constitute a compact voting majority but, 
despite racially polarized bloc voting, that group is not put into 
a district.”56 However, Bartlett also indicates that where voting 
is not racially polarized, in so-called “crossover districts,”57 
Section 2 does not entitle minority voters to the creation of 
majority-minority districts.58 
 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. 
Holder,59 Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA required “covered” 
jurisdictions—including districts with a history of racial 
gerrymandering—to obtain pre-clearance from either the 
Attorney General or a three-judge federal district court for any 
 
 52. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 18 (stating that the majority-minority rule 
“provides straightforward guidance to courts and to those officials charged 
with drawing district lines to comply with § 2”).  
 53. Id. at 13.  
 54. See Parsons, supra note 31, at 1120 (indicating that Strickland may 
impose a requirement for the creation of majority-minority districts where 
racially polarized voting is “stark”).  
 55. 556 U.S. 1 (2009).  
 56. Id. at 19. 
 57. See id. at 13 (defining “crossover districts” as those in which “the 
minority population [is not the majority but], at least potentially, is large 
enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help from voters who are 
members of the majority and who cross over to support the minority’s 
preferred candidate”). 
 58. See id. at 23–24 (indicating that majority-minority districts are 
required only where the Gingles factors and the totality of the circumstances 
mandate that result, and that in the alternative, crossover districts are 
permissible).  
 59. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).  
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change in the jurisdiction’s voting procedures.60 In other words, 
Section 5 prohibited changes that “would lead to a retrogression 
in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise” in covered jurisdictions.61 In 
order to determine whether a change in voting procedures would 
cause a retrogression, courts compared the proposed voting 
practice to current practice to determine whether the change 
had the purpose or effect of compromising the right to vote based 
on race.62 
 In 2010, Shelby County, Alabama sued the United States 
Attorney General, claiming that Section 4 of the VRA was 
unconstitutional because it was not justified by the current 
voting conditions in covered jurisdictions.63 The Supreme Court 
agreed and held unconstitutional the coverage formula that 
Congress established in Section 4 of the VRA to determine 
which districts required pre-clearance.64 In doing so, the Court 
abrogated one of the most significant voting rights protections 
of the twentieth century.65  
 The Court’s approach to the issue presented in Shelby 
County is relevant to the analysis of North Carolina’s 
gerrymandering jurisprudence.66 In Shelby County, the 
Attorney General argued that because the coverage formula was 
responsive to the “extraordinary problem” of discrimination in 
 
 60. See id. at 537 (describing the preclearance requirements under 
Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA) (citing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973c(b)–(d) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304)).  
 61. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).  
 62. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883–84 (1994) (describing the test 
for retrogression under Section 5 of the VRA); Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 
3d 600, 605 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (stating the purpose of Section 5 of the VRA).  
 63. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 540–42.  
 64. See id. at 556–57 (indicating that Congress had relied on 
forty-year-old data to create its coverage formula, and its failure to update the 
coverage formula to match current conditions rendered the formula 
unconstitutional). 
 65. See id. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Throwing out preclearance 
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes 
is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting 
wet.”); Editorial, The Voters Abandoned by the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016, 
at A26 (arguing the Shelby County decision “set back the cause of racial 
equality at the voting booth by decades”).  
 66. See infra Part V.  
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voting at the time it was enacted in 1965, its continued use was 
justified so long as any discrimination remained in the covered 
jurisdictions with respect to voting rights.67 The Attorney 
General rested his position on the long-standing history of 
race-based voter discrimination and suppression.68 However, 
the Court was not satisfied with these arguments because 
“history did not end in 1965.”69 The Court in Shelby County thus 
signaled that pre-VRA history was not enough to uphold the 
safeguards of Sections 4 and 5, but that evidence of pre-VRA 
discrimination paired with recent and continuing post-VRA 
discrimination, could justify voting rights protections.70  
 As will be discussed in Part V of this Note, a similar 
consideration of a state’s record on racial and partisan 
gerrymandering, both recent and long-standing, is required in 
order to prevent the erosion of the fundamental right to elect 
representatives of one’s choosing.71 Based on the implications of 
the Court’s decision in Shelby County, the combination of a 
recent and long-standing history of discrimination should be 
enough to trigger the voting rights safeguards that this Note 
proposes in Part V.72 
 
 67. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 552. 
 68. See id. at 552–53 (stating that the Government relied on the South’s 
history of slavery before the Civil War and Jim Crow policies but did not 
consider the improved modern landscape of voting rights in the South).  
 69. See id. at 552 (“In assessing the current need for a preclearance 
system that treats States differently from one another today, [the post-VRA] 
history cannot be ignored.”). 
 70. See id. at 557 (“Our country has changed, and while any racial 
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the 
legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”). 
 71. See infra Part V. 
 72. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (indicating that 
extraordinary remedies, like the protections under Sections 4 and 5 of the 
VRA, can only be justified when there are current needs). 
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III.  A Case Study of Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering in 
North Carolina 
Racial gerrymandering is not always easy to distinguish 
from partisan gerrymandering.73 North Carolina’s 
congressional districting map,74 which has been the subject of 
over a quarter century of litigation surrounding issues of racial 
and partisan gerrymandering,75 serves as an apt example of the 
often-narrow line between motivations for gerrymandering.76   
A.  From Shaw to Cromartie I  
The long and winding story of racial and partisan 
gerrymandering in North Carolina begins with Shaw v. Reno 
(Shaw I).77 In Shaw I, the Supreme Court evaluated a claim of 
 
 73. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (describing the “difficulty of 
determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it 
purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race”) (citing Wright 
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 11 (1964)); Ely, supra note 5, at 498 (stating that the 
“predominant purpose” test used in Cromartie II is problematic where political 
purposes and racial-motivated purposes are “inextricably intertwined,” as 
they were in Cromartie II); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 
2492 (2019) (defining gerrymandering as the packing of voters of a certain race 
or political affiliation into one district so they win by a large margin, “wasting” 
votes that would improve their chances in others, or cracking a group across 
multiple districts such that it fails to create a majority in any district).  
 74. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 240 n.76 (explaining that the political party 
in power in the North Carolina General Assembly gains control of the State’s 
congressional redistricting process and that the governor does not play a role 
in redistricting).  
 75. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 76. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646 (“[R]edistricting differs from other kinds 
of state decisionmaking in that the legislature is always aware of race when it 
draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and 
political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors.”); Pitts, supra 
note 8, at 242 (noting that North Carolina’s congressional districts have been 
the subject of more racial gerrymandering litigation in the Supreme Court 
than any other state districting maps).  
 77. See Shaw I, 509 U.S at 633–34 (describing the plaintiff-voters’ claim 
that North Carolina’s reapportionment plan “which contain[ed] district 
boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitute[d] an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander”). 
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racial gerrymandering for the first time.78 Five registered North 
Carolina voters challenged the revised boundaries of North 
Carolina Congressional District 1 and District 12, alleging they 
were drawn using an unconstitutional consideration of race. 79 
The North Carolina General Assembly drew the contested map 
after the United States Attorney General rejected its first 
attempt to draw district lines following the 1990 census, on VRA 
grounds.80 The General Assembly’s purpose in drawing the 
revised map was to allow Black voters to control the outcome of 
the elections in District 1 and District 12.81 The revised map 
that was the subject of Shaw I included two majority-minority 
districts: District 1 and District 12.82  
Immediately, the Court noted the odd shapes of District 1 
and District 12.83 The Court described District 1 as “[c]entered 
in the northeast portion of the state, it moves southward until 
it tapers into a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, 
it reaches into the southernmost part of the State near the 
South Carolina border.”84 District 12 was stranger still: “[i]t 
winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial 
 
 78. Id. at 636; see Pitts, supra note 8, at 230 (indicating that the voters’ 
claims in Shaw I were the first claims of racial gerrymandering recognized by 
the Court).  
 79. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 636–37 (“Appellants are five residents of 
Durham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. Under 
the General Assembly’s plan, two will vote . . . in District 12 and three will 
vote in neighboring District 2.”).  
 80. See id. at 634–35 (explaining that the district map affected counties 
located in areas covered by Section 5 of the VRA, so the map was subject to 
review by the United States Attorney General who objected to the General 
Assembly’s first attempt after the 1990 census); see also supra Part II.  
 81. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 230 (discussing the nature of the claims in 
Shaw I).  
 82. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 635 (“[T]he General Assembly enacted a 
revised redistricting plan, 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws, ch. 7, that included a 
second majority-[B]lack district.”).  
 83. See id. (noting that District 12 was “even more unusually shaped” 
than District 1).  
 84. Id.  
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centers, and manufacturing areas ‘until it gobbles in enough 
enclaves of [B]lack neighborhoods.’”85  
The strangely-drawn boundary lines of District 1 and 
District 12 raised the Court’s suspicions about the factors on 
which the General Assembly relied.86 The Court recognized that 
“[a] reapportionment plan that includes in one district 
individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise 
widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and 
who may have little in common with one another but the color 
of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political 
apartheid.”87 The Court went on to confirm its rejection of the 
race-based stereotype that “members of the same racial 
group . . . [regardless of other factors] think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at 
the polls.”88 Under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence 
this type of racial stereotyping was impermissible, spelling 
trouble for the redistricting plan.89   
In addition to its concern that racial gerrymandering 
entrenches racial stereotypes, the Court reasoned that when 
state legislatures create a district based primarily on the 
perceived common interests of a particular racial group, elected 
officials “are more likely to believe that their primary obligation 
is to represent only the members of that group” rather than the 
general electorate.90 Because this type of race-based political 
incentive “is altogether antithetical to our system of 
representative democracy” the Court concluded that  
 
 85. Id. at 635–36 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476–77 
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); 
see Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 20, 1993), https://perma.cc/RER3-RSE5 (quoting a member of the North 
Carolina Legislature describing District 12’s meandering path along 
Interstate 85: “If you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you’d 
kill most of the people in the district”).   
 86. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 641 (“It is unsettling how closely the North 
Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past.”).  
 87. Id. at 647.  
 88. Id.  
 89. See id. at 647–48 (“We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as 
impermissible racial stereotypes.” (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 
n.2 (1990))).  
 90. Id. at 648.  
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a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the 
Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that 
the legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally 
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 
separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, 
and that that the separation lacks sufficient justification.91  
The majority decision in Shaw I established the standard 
for this new judicial doctrine of racial gerrymandering under the 
Equal Protection Clause and set the stage for the last 
twenty-five years of gerrymandering challenges in North 
Carolina, as well as in other states.92 
Justice White, Justice Stevens, and Justice Souter each 
authored a dissent. Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens and 
Justice Souter, suggested that the racial gerrymandering in this 
case should be treated similarly to other types of 
gerrymandering, including political gerrymandering, and 
therefore should not be subject to strict scrutiny, but rather a 
less rigorous analysis.93 In his dissent, Justice Souter also 
concluded that racial gerrymandering should not trigger strict 
scrutiny because, unlike other types of race-based state actions, 
“the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of 
another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others.”94 
 
 91. Id. at 649.  
 92. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 230 (“Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to 
say that racial gerrymandering doctrine was to election law what Nirvana’s 
‘Nevermind’ was to rock music during the 1990’s—the groundbreaking 
moment of the decade.”).  
 93. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 662–63 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)  
[E]ven assuming that racial (or political) factors were considered in 
the drawing of district boundaries, a showing of discriminatory 
effects is a “threshold requirement” in the absence of which there is 
no equal protection violation, and no need to “reach the question of 
the state interests . . . served by the particular districts.” (citing 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 142–43);  
Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate 
representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic 
Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily 
follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of 
the very minority group whose history in the Unites States gave 
birth to the Equal Protection Clause.  
 94. Id. at 681–82 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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However, the majority rejected these arguments because there 
was no precedent requiring that partisan gerrymandering and 
racial gerrymandering be subject to the same level of scrutiny.95 
Rather, the majority relied on the troubling and persistent 
history of racial discrimination in voting rights and its 
“Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has 
reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of 
race” to justify its application of strict scrutiny in this case.96 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on the history of racial 
discrimination in Shaw I is relevant to this Note’s discussion of 
partisan gerrymandering in a post-Rucho world.97 The history 
of racial gerrymandering, and partisan gerrymandering with 
racial undertones, brings forth similar concerns regarding the 
overall fairness of reapportionment and representation in North 
Carolina today.98 
On remand, the three-judge district court again upheld the 
districting plan.99 The Eastern District of North Carolina 
concluded that race was the principal deciding factor in 
determining where to draw the district boundaries, but that “the 
legislation passe[d] strict scrutiny as a sufficiently narrowly 
tailored effort by the state legislature to serve the State’s 
compelling interest in complying with” the remedial 
requirements of Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA.100   
While the litigation surrounding this redistricting scheme 
was slowly moving through the court system, North Carolina 
held congressional elections using the challenged map in 1992 
and 1994.101 In each of those elections, two out of the twelve 
winning candidates were African Americans elected from 
 
 95. Id. at 650 (majority opinion).  
 96. See id. (addressing Justice Stevens’ and Justice Souter’s dissenting 
opinions).  
 97. See infra Part V. 
 98. See infra Part V.  
 99. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1994). 
 100. Id.  
 101. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 236 (describing the 1992 and 1994 elections 
using the map precleared by the U.S. Justice Department).  
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Districts 1 and 12 respectively.102 Despite these two elections, 
the legal battle over Districts 1 and 12 was far from over.  
The 1992 redistricting plan returned to the Supreme Court 
in Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II).103 There, the Court recognized that 
a state may use racial distinctions to remedy past racial 
discrimination only when the discrimination is “identified 
discrimination.”104 Discrimination is identifiable when it is 
specific and where “the institution that [made] the racial 
distinction . . . had a ‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude that 
remedial action was necessary” before it made use of that 
race-based distinction.105 The Supreme Court agreed with the 
district court that the State had not presented sufficient 
evidence that the map was drawn for primarily remedial 
measures.106  
Addressing the State’s argument that its race-based 
redistricting satisfied strict scrutiny as an effort to comply with 
the VRA, the Court noted that it had not yet addressed the 
 
 102. See id. at 235–36 
The results of [the 1994] election were the same as the 1992 election 
in terms of the delegation’s racial composition, as two of the 
candidates were African American. However, the partisan 
composition of the delegation changed dramatically, jumping from 
four to eight Republican members, following the national trend of 
the so-called “Republican Revolution.” 
 103. 517 U.S. 899 (1996); see 28 U.S.C. § 2285 (“A district court of three 
judges shall be convened when . . . an action is filed challenging the 
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the 
apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (“Except 
as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court 
from . . . [a] suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and 
determined by a district court of three judges.”). 
 104. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 909 (“‘While the States and their 
subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess evidence’ of past or 
present discrimination, ‘they must identify that discrimination, public or 
private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.’” 
(quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989))). 
 105. Id. at 910 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 
(1986)).   
 106. See id. at 910–12 (“[T]here is little to suggest that the legislature 
considered the historical events and social-science data that the reports [on 
past discrimination] recount . . . We certainly cannot say on the basis of these 
reports that the District Court’s findings on this point were clearly 
erroneous.”).  
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question of whether compliance with the VRA could be a 
compelling state interest.107 The Justices again avoided that 
question, finding “that creating an additional majority-[B]lack 
district was not required under a correct reading of § 5 and that 
District 12, as drawn, [was] not a remedy narrowly tailored to 
the State’s professed interest in avoiding § 2 liability.”108 While 
holding that District 12 was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
North Carolina’s interest in complying with Section 2 of the 
VRA,109 the Court did not reach the merits of the racial 
gerrymandering claim as it pertained to District 1, finding that 
the challengers lacked standing.110  
The Supreme Court decided Shaw II in June of 1996, but 
on remand the district court allowed the State to continue using 
the unconstitutional map in 1996 elections.111 After the 1996 
election, the North Carolina General Assembly made another 
attempt at redistricting: its 1997 plan served as a “catalyst for 
more lawsuits.”112 
 
 107. Id. at 911.  
 108. See id. at 911–15  
“[A] State’s policy of adhering to other districting principles instead 
of creating as many majority-minority districts as possible does not 
support an inference that the plan so discriminates on the basis of 
race or color as to violate the Constitution, and thus cannot provide 
any basis under § 5 for the Justice Department’s objection.” 
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924 (1995)); 
Pitts, supra note 8, at 236–37 (summarizing the Court’s reasoning in Shaw 
II).  
 109. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 918.  
 110. See id. at 904 (explaining that because none of the plaintiffs resided 
in District 1, they had no standing to challenge the boundary “absent specific 
evidence that [they] personally had been subjected to a racial classification,” 
which was not presented to the Court).  
 111. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to 
Racial Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case 
Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227, 261 (2001) (“The district court permitted 
the State to hold the 1996 elections under the 1992 Plan, but enjoined further 
use of the plan in future elections.”); Pitts, supra note 8, at 237 (stating that 
the 1996 elections, held using the map declared unconstitutional in Shaw II, 
produced Black congresspeople from District 1 and District 12 again and an 
even 6-6 partisan split).  
 112. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 111, at 262.  
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In response to the Court’s decisions in Shaw I and Shaw II 
striking down the 1992 congressional map as an impermissible 
racial gerrymander,113 the North Carolina General Assembly 
enacted a new districting plan (1997 map).114 The General 
Assembly intended the 1997 map to remedy the constitutional 
shortcomings of the 1992 map—namely that the map 
impermissibly drew district boundaries to create majority-Black 
districts.115 The new District 12 was no longer a 
majority-minority district, and rather than splitting ten 
counties, the new District 12 only touched six.116 Although the 
1997 map produced a District 12 that was wider and shorter 
than the 1992 version, it “retain[ed] its basic ‘snakelike’ shape 
and continu[ed] to track Interstate-85.”117 Residents of District 
1 joined the Shaw plaintiffs from District 12 to challenge the 
1997 map on the theory that, like the 1992 map, race 
predominated the drawing of congressional district 
boundaries.118 The three-judge district court ruled on the 
parties’ competing motions for summary judgment and granted 
the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction prohibiting the use of the 
1997 map in the North Carolina’s upcoming general election.119  
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that while the 
plaintiff-appellees’ evidence supported the argument that the 
General Assembly had an impermissible racial motive when it 
 
 113. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 114. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 543 (1999) (citing 1997 N.C. Sess. 
Laws, ch. 11) (stating that the State enacted the 1997 redistricting plan in 
response to the Court’s decision in Shaw II).  
 115. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 111, at 262 (“The General 
Assembly’s stated purpose in enacting this new plan was to cure the 
constitutional defects of the 1992 Plan and preserve the existing partisan 
balance in the North Carolina congressional delegation.”).  
 116. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 544 (explaining that Black voters 
accounted for 46 percent of registered voters in the 1997 iteration of District 
12 and describing the boundaries of District 12).  
 117. Id. (citation omitted).  
 118. See Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407, 409 (E.D.N.C. 2000) 
(describing the events that led to the State’s appeal to the Supreme Court in 
Cromartie I).  
 119. See Cromartie v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1029–30 (E.D.N.C. 1998) 
(granting the plaintiff’s request for an injunction).  
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drew the 1997 map, that evidence was not uncontroverted.120 
The State-appellants asserted that “the General Assembly drew 
its district lines with the intent to make District 12 a strong 
Democratic district” and to “protect incumbents, to adhere to 
traditional districting criteria, and preserve the existing 
partisan balance in the State’s congressional delegation, which 
in 1997 was composed of six Republicans and six Democrats.”121 
In other words, the State argued the 1997 map was motivated 
by partisan, not racial, considerations.  
The Supreme Court agreed that because North Carolina’s 
Black voters overwhelmingly voted Democratic,122 it was not 
simple to distinguish a partisan motivation to create a 
Democrat-controlled district from an impermissible racial 
motivation based on evidence of voter registration rather than 
voting behavior.123 Because the General Assembly’s motivation 
is an issue of fact,124 and because that motivation was still in 
dispute before the Supreme Court, the Court remanded the case 
to the district court for a full assessment of the General 
Assembly’s motivations.125  
 
 120. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 548–49 (indicating that most of the 
evidence presented by the plaintiffs was circumstantial evidence showing that 
the 1997 map had “low scores with respect to traditional measures of 
compactness” and that the plaintiffs had “presented no direct evidence of 
intent” to draw boundaries based on race).  
 121. Id. at 549.  
 122. See id. at 550 (agreeing with the affidavit of Dr. David W. Peterson, 
an expert witness for the State, who reviewed racial demographics and party 
affiliation and compared the results to election data to discern the correlation 
between race and partisan preference); Party Affiliation Among Adults in 
North Carolina by Race/Ethnicity, PEW RSCH. CTR. (2014), 
https://perma.cc/NDX2-3FUX (showing that 79 percent of Black voters polled 
were affiliated with the Democratic Party in 2014).  
 123. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 550 (stating that Dr. Peterson’s analysis 
strengthened the inference that the General Assembly was motivated by 
politics rather than race).  
 124. See id. (“The legislature’s motivation is itself a factual question.”).  
 125. See id. at 551   
[A]ppellees were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our 
prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in 
constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that 
the most loyal Democrats happen to be [B]lack Democrats and even 
if the State were conscious of that fact. 
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B.  Cromartie II: Gerrymandering for a New Millennium 
Having learned the lessons of the Supreme Court’s 
twentieth century racial gerrymandering jurisprudence, the 
North Carolina General Assembly began the millennium with a 
new and successful strategy to justify its 1997 district map: 
drawing district lines to ensure partisan advantage.126  
On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in Cromartie 
I, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina found that race was the General Assembly’s 
predominant motivation in drawing the boundaries of both 
Congressional District 1 and District 12.127 However, the court 
found that the 1997 map’s District 1 satisfied strict scrutiny 
because “[t]here was a compelling state interest in obtaining 
pre-clearance under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the 
1st District was narrowly tailored to meet [that] interest.”128 
The district court went on to find the ever-problematic District 
12 was facially race motivated,129 and that there was no 
compelling state interest to justify the racial motivation.130 
Accordingly, the district court held that District 12 was an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.131 
 
 126. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999) (rejecting 
plaintiff-appellees’ claims of impermissible racial gerrymandering based on 
evidence that the legislators “in crafting their districting law, . . . attempted 
to protect incumbents, to adhere to traditional districting criteria, and to 
preserve the existing partisan balance in the State’s congressional delegation, 
which in 1997 was composed of six Republicans and six Democrats”); 
Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (finding the district court’s conclusion 
that the legislature relied on race rather than politics to draw the 1997 map 
was clearly erroneous because “race in this case correlates closely with 
political behavior”). 
 127. Cromartie, 133 F. Supp. 2d. at 420, 423.  
 128. Id. at 423.  
 129. See id. at 420 (“It is clear that the Twelfth District was drawn to 
collect precincts with high racial identification rather than political 
identification. Additionally, the evidence demonstrates that . . . more heavily 
Democratic precincts . . . were bypassed in the drawing of District 12 in favor 
of precincts with a higher African-American population.”).  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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District 12 returned to the Supreme Court for the fourth 
time in Cromartie II.132 The Court framed the challenger’s 
burden rigorously, stating that in order to successfully claim 
that the General Assembly impermissibly relied on race, the 
plaintiff-appellees had to show “at a minimum that the 
‘legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 
principles . . . to racial considerations’”133 and that race was “the 
predominant factor” motivating the districting decision.134 The 
Court further qualified its analysis based on deference to the 
State legislature’s competence in the area of redistricting,135 
particularly in this case “where the State ha[d] articulated a 
legitimate political explanation for its districting decision, and 
the voting population is one in which race and political 
affiliation are highly correlated.”136 
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer concluded that the 
evidence presented at the district court did not support the 
plaintiff-appellees’ “‘race not politics’ thesis.”137 Although the 
evidence showed that the General Assembly did consider race,138 
it also clearly considered geographical and political factors.139 
Thus, the evidence of racial consideration did not establish that 
“race played a predominant role comparatively speaking.”140  
The majority went on to articulate a standard by which 
voters could bring a challenge to districting maps on racial and 
 
 132. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).  
 133. Id. at 241 (“[T]he burden of proof on the plaintiffs (who attack the 
district) is a ‘demanding one.’” (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 
(1995))).  
 134. Id. (citing Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 547).  
 135. See id. at 242 (“[T]he underlying districting decision is one that 
ordinarily falls within a legislature’s sphere of competence.”).  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 255 (stating that the plaintiff-appellees’ evidence that there 
were reliably Democratic majority-White counties that could have been used 
to achieve partisan balance was not sufficient to support their claim of racial 
gerrymandering).  
 138. See id. at 253–54 (referring to legislative redistricting leader 
then-Senator Roy Cooper’s 1997 testimony that the legislature drew the map 
with “race in mind,” and an email a legislative staff member sent to Senator 
Cooper, referring to moving the “Greensboro Black community into the 12th”).  
 139. Id. at 253. 
 140. Id.  
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partisan grounds in cases where majority-minority districts are 
at issue and race tends to correlate highly with political 
affiliation.141 
[T]he party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries 
must show at the least that the legislature could have 
achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative 
ways that are comparably consistent with traditional 
districting principles. That party must also show that those 
districting alternatives would have brought about 
significantly greater racial balance.142 
 Despite the “modicum of evidence” supporting the district 
court’s conclusion,143 the Court in Cromartie II determined that 
because race and political behavior were closely correlated in 
this case and because the plaintiffs had not made the required 
showing under the Court’s new test, the district court’s 
conclusion was clearly erroneous.144  
 The Court’s decision in Cromartie II drew some scholarly 
attention. John Hart Ely questioned the majority’s reasoning 
that Black voters were moved from one district to another 
because they were reliable Democratic voters.145 Ely alludes to 
the likely pretextual use of partisanship as a motivation, 
wondering “why if [politics] had been the point of the selections 
in question, they were described by those who made them in 
racial terms.”146 He also takes issue with the Court’s rule that 
racial gerrymandering is established where “race rather 
than . . . political behavior”147 predominated.148 According to 
 
 141. See id. at 258 (noting that this standard also applies to “approximate 
equivalent[s]” of majority-minority districts).  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 257. 
 144. Id. at 257–58 (“The basic question is whether the legislature drew 
District 12’s boundaries because of race rather than because of political 
behavior (coupled with traditional nonracial districting considerations).”).  
 145. See Ely, supra note 5, at 495 (stating that the Court’s prior decisions 
striking down racial gerrymanders make it “difficult to imagine what could 
have been thought the gain in dressing political motives in the language of 
race”).  
 146. Id.  
 147. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).  
 148. Ely, supra note 5, at 496. 
Dalessio.PostBluelines.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:54 PM 
1932 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1907 (2020) 
 
Ely, this distinction is difficult to make because, while it can be 
hard to even discern one’s own predominant purpose for one’s 
actions, “attempting to determine the ‘predominant purpose’ of 
the North Carolina legislature . . . compounds the 
impossibility.”149 Thus, according to Ely, Cromartie II was 
wrongly decided and problematic for the Court’s 
gerrymandering jurisprudence.150 
 According to other scholars, Cromartie II signaled the 
Court’s retreat “from strictly policing the boundaries of racial 
gerrymandering . . . [and] thereby signaled its commitment to 
race consciousness and descriptive representation at the 
expense of its anticlassification jurisprudence.”151 Cromartie II, 
thus,  
provided a safe harbor of sorts for the states when they drew 
majority-minority districts. As long as they could plausibly 
claim those districts were drawn for partisan reasons—and 
given the correlation between racial and political identity, 
that claim can almost always be made—the states are likely 
to prevail against claims of racial gerrymandering.152  
The Cromartie II decision therefore, began to set the stage 
for the problem addressed in this Note: namely, after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, if the 
Court muddles the distinction between racial and partisan 
gerrymandering, apparent partisanship becomes an effective 
shield from judicial review for redistricting that might 
otherwise be classified as racial gerrymandering.153  
After the Court’s decision in Cromartie II, the first decade 
of the new millennium was a quiet period for North Carolina 
 
 149. Id.  
 150. See id. at 490 (arguing that the majority’s finding of clear error was 
itself erroneous and that the Court’s decision in Cromartie II implicitly 
approved of racial stereotyping in partisan gerrymandering claims).  
 151. Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and Representation 
Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, 
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1585 (2018).  
 152. Id. at 1578–79.   
 153. See infra Part V.  
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redistricting litigation.154 During that period, Democrats held 
six to eight of North Carolina’s congressional seats and the 
district boundaries were not challenged in court.155 
In the 2010 election cycle, Republicans gained control of the 
North Carolina General Assembly for the “first time since 1870, 
thus securing control of the redistricting process.”156 The 
Republicans “inherited a political scene” where Democrats, 
including two African-American Democrats, held a narrow 
majority—seven out of thirteen congressional seats.157 
After redrawing the district map in 2011,158 in the 2012 
election Republicans won nine out of thirteen congressional 
seats, despite only garnering 49.1 percent of the popular vote.159 
In 2014, the Republicans further entrenched their majority, 
winning ten out of thirteen seats with 55.8 percent of the 
popular vote.160 
The method the Republican leaders, North Carolina State 
Senator Robert Rucho and State Representative David Lewis, 
 
 154. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 239 (stating that during this period “[t]he 
Democratic Party[, which] again controlled the redistricting process, drew two 
districts (District 1 and 12) to allow African-American voters to elect 
candidates of choice”).  
 155. See JEFF TRANDAHL, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2, 2004 at 49–50 (2005), 
https://perma.cc/YL26-WLMZ (PDF) (providing election results for the 2004 
congressional election); LORRAINE C. MILLER, STATISTICS OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 7, 2006 at 34 (2007), 
https://perma.cc/N7EX-27FH (PDF) (providing election results for the 2006 
congressional election); LORRAINE C. MILLER, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4, 2008 at 49 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/E9LP-5DMD (PDF) (providing election results for the 2008 
congressional elections); see also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465–66 
(2017) (observing that the congressional districts drawn as a result of the 2000 
census were not challenged in court).  
 156. Pitts, supra note 8, at 240.  
 157. Id.   
 158. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 607–08 (M.D.N.C. 2016) 
(describing the 2011 redistricting process).  
 159. See Michael Kent Curtis, Using the Voting Rights Act to Discriminate: 
North Carolina’s Use of Racial Gerrymanders, Two Racial Quotas, Safe 
Harbors, Shields, and Inoculations to Undermine Multiracial Coalitions and 
Black Political Power, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 421, 434–35 (2016) (calling the 
2011 redistricting a Republican gerrymander).  
 160. Id. at 435.  
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used to effectuate their gerrymander had a clear racial 
component.161 In order to ensure compliance with Section 2 of 
the VRA,162 Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis instructed 
Dr. Thomas Hofeller, a private redistricting coordinator, to 
“classify residents based on race so as to include a sufficient 
number of [B]lack voters inside such districts, and consequently 
exclude [W]hite voters from the districts, in an effort to achieve 
a desired racial composition of >50% T[otal] B[lack] V[oting] 
A[ge] P[opulation]” and proportionality between Black senators 
and representatives and the Black voting-age population in the 
state.163 The results of their efforts “neared quota perfection.”164  
C.  Gerrymandering Round Three: District 12’s Fifth 
Appearance Before the Supreme Court 
In 2016, the 2011 map was successfully challenged in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina, which found that race was the predominant motivator 
for the boundary lines of District 12.165 The court also found the 
defendants’ purported rationale—that partisan objectives 
predominated—unconvincing.166 Finally, the court noted that 
“[t]o find that otherwise would create a ‘magic words’ test that 
would put an end to these types of challenges,” namely that by 
 
 161. See id. at 436–37 (indicating that the Republicans successfully 
engineered a quota system in which “the legislature was to have [B]lack 
senators and representatives in proportion to the [B]lack-voting-age 
population of the state . . . [while] creat[ing] as many as possible 
[B]lack-majority districts with 50% plus T[otal] B[lack] V[oting] A[ge] 
P[opulation]”).  
 162. See Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 608 (“[D]istricts created to comply with 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, must be created with a ‘Black Voting Age 
Population’ (‘BVAP’), as reported by the Census, at the level of at least 50% 
plus one.” (quoting a June 17, 2011 public statement by Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis)).  
 163. See Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238, 262–63 (N.C. 2014) (Beasley, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the same map at issue 
in Harris).  
 164. Curtis, supra note 159, at 437.  
 165. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d. at 621–22 (“Traditional redistricting 
principles such as compactness and contiguity were subordinated to this 
goal.”).  
 166. Id. at 622. 
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using “magic words” of partisanship, rather than race, 
legislators could obscure racial gerrymanders as partisan 
gerrymanders to escape strict scrutiny.167  
The district court also held that District 1 was an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.168 The court gave the legislature two weeks 
to draft a remedial redistricting map to cure the racial 
gerrymander.169 The revised map was again challenged in the 
district court on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander.170 The court rejected the plaintiff-voters’ 
claims and allowed the 2016 election to proceed using the 
remedial map.171 The 2016 election results were the same as the 
2014 results—Republicans won ten out of thirteen available 
seats.172 
But the Harris v. McCrory173 plaintiffs were not done. In 
2017, they appealed to the Supreme Court, which once again 
determined that racial considerations predominated the 
 
 167. Id. (quoting Dickson, 766 S.E.2d. at 269 (Beasley, J., dissenting)); see 
Dickson, 766 S.E.2d. at 269 (Beasley, J., dissenting) 
To allow this serpentine district . . . to be drafted for political 
advantage is a proxy for racial disenfranchisement and effectively 
creates a “magic words” threshold. Upholding this district’s 
tortured construction creates an incentive for legislators to stay “on 
script” and avoid mentioning race on the record, and in this 
instance, it is disingenuous to suggest that race is not the 
predominant factor. 
 168. See id. at 611 (“CD 1 presents a textbook example of racial 
predominance. There is an extraordinary amount of direct 
evidence— legislative records, public statements, instructions to Dr. Hofeller, 
the ‘principal architect’ of the 2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan, and 
testimony—that shows a racial quota, or floor, of 50-percent-plus-one-person 
was established for CD 1.”).  
 169. Id. at 627.  
 170. Harris v. McCrory, No. 13-cv-949, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71853, at *6 
(M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016) (quoting Representative Lewis, who led the remedial 
map-drawing as saying “I acknowledge freely that this would be a political 
gerrymander”).  
 171. Id. at *8.  
 172. Pitts, supra note 8, at 241–42.  
 173. No. 13-cv-949, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71853 (M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016).   
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composition of District 1 and District 12.174 With respect to 
District 1, the Court found that compliance with the VRA did 
not require the racial quota system put in place by Senator 
Rucho and Representative Lewis and therefore the district could 
not withstand strict scrutiny.175  
District 12 fared no better in “its fifth(!) appearance before 
[the] Court.”176 The Supreme Court agreed with the district 
court, finding that the leaders of the 2011 redistricting plan had 
“repeatedly described the influx of African-Americans into 
District 12 as a § 5 [of the VRA] compliance measure, not a 
side-effect of political gerrymandering.”177 The Court’s reliance 
on the General Assembly’s own description of its redistricting 
decisions, which in this case were facially race-based, to 
determine the nature of a particular gerrymander likely 
signaled that sanitizing the record of references to race may 
insulate map-drawers’ decisions from the Court’s most exacting 
scrutiny.178 
Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy dissented with regard to 
District 12.179 In the dissenters’ view, the decision regarding 
District 12 should have mirrored the decision in Cromartie II.180 
Following that logic, where a state claims partisan goals were 
the predominant motivating factor in redistricting, in the 
dissenters’ view, the challengers must put forth an “alternative 
 
 174. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1482 (2017) (“[R]acial 
considerations predominated in designing both District 1 and District 
12. . . . For District 1, we further uphold the District Court’s decision that § 2 
of the VRA gave North Carolina no good reason to reshuffle voters because of 
their race.”).   
 175. Id. at 1472.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 1478.  
 178. See infra Part V.  
 179. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1486 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part).  
 180. See id. at 1488–90 
Cromartie II plainly meant to establish a rule for use in a broad 
class of cases and not a rule to be employed one time only. . . . The 
alternative-map requirement . . . is a logical response to the 
difficult problem of distinguishing between racial and political 
motivations when race and political party preference closely 
correlate.  
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redistricting map that served the legislature’s political objective 
as well as the challenged version without producing the same 
racial effects.”181 The dissent went on to rigorously scrutinize 
the evidence before the Court, and concluded that the 
mapmaker’s approach was consistent with the legislature’s 
stated political motives.182 The dissent also found that the effect 
of the redistricting on racial minorities was an inevitable 
consequence of executing the map for Republican partisan 
advantage,183 and that the majority “read[] far too much 
into . . . references” of race from the leaders of the 2011 plan.184 
Justices Alito and Kennedy therefore would have upheld 
District 12 as an “unsavory”185 but permissible partisan 
gerrymander.186 
After a quarter century of litigation surrounding North 
Carolina’s attempts to manipulate the electorate, the North 
Carolina General Assembly was no doubt aware that the “basic 
question [regarding constitutionality of a redistricting plan] is 
whether the legislature drew . . . boundaries because of race 
rather than because of political behavior.”187 The General 
Assembly was also on notice that partisan gerrymanders were 
likely to be upheld, so long as there were no obvious racial 
references in the record.188 Taken together, these cases confirm 
 
 181. Id. at 1486.  
 182. See id. at 1492–94 (summarizing the evidence that the maps were 
drawn to “maximize Republican opportunities”). 
 183. See id. at 1496 (“[S]o long as the legislature chose to retain the basic 
shape of District 12 and to increase the number of Democrats in the district, 
it was inevitable that the Democrats brought in would be disproportionately 
[B]lack.”).  
 184. Id. at 1497.   
 185. Id. at 1487 (“Partisan gerrymandering is always unsavory, but that 
is not the issue here.”).  
 186. Id. at 1504.  
 187. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).  
 188. See id. at 257 (dismissing the challengers’ evidence that racial 
considerations predominated the 1997 boundaries of District 12 because the 
Court determined race and political behavior closely correlated); Cooper v. 
Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1478 (2017) (relying on the General Assembly’s 
references to race to find that the 2011 redistricting plan was a racial 
gerrymander); id. at 1497 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority 
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that even where there is some evidence that race played a role 
in drawing district boundaries, the overall scheme may be 
constitutional if a state legislature puts forth evidence that 
political concerns were the primary motivator.189 The Court 
went on to decide Rucho v. Common Cause against this tangled 
backdrop of partisan and racial gerrymandering jurisprudence 
spanning a quarter century.190  
IV. Rucho v. Common Cause and the Justiciability of Partisan 
Gerrymandering  
After the Supreme Court held North Carolina’s 2011 map 
unconstitutional in Cooper v. Harris,191 Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis went back to the drawing board.192 They 
hired Dr. Thomas Hofeller, the same districting expert who 
aided them in drawing the 2011 map.193 Representative Lewis 
and Senator Rucho instructed Dr. Hofeller to use precinct-level 
election results to create a map that would ensure maintenance 
of the state congressional delegation’s partisan balance, which, 
as elected under the racially gerrymandered plan, included ten 
Republicans and three Democrats.194 Dr. Hofeller was to do all 
of this while moving a small number of district lines to cure the 
 
relied too heavily on the references to race made by the leaders of the 2011 
redistricting to find that race was the predominant motivator for District 12’s 
boundaries).  
 189. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 257 (explaining that because 
“race . . . correlate[d] closely with political behavior” the presence of “a 
modicum of evidence” that race was a factor in drawing district lines was not 
enough to show a constitutional violation).  
 190. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 191. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).  
 192. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 805 (M.D.N.C. 
2018) (“Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho again took charge of drawing 
the remedial districting plan.”).  
 193. Id; see Hansi Lo Wang, Deceased GOP Strategist’s Daughter Makes 
Files Public that Republicans Wanted Sealed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 5, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/V26K-623S (discussing files found on Dr. Hofeller’s hard 
drives that were used to create the North Carolina congressional district 
maps). The Google Drive folders with Dr. Hofeller’s daughter’s copies of the 
hard drives referenced in this article have been taken down since the 
publication of this source. 
 194. Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 805. 
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racial gerrymander of the 2011 map.195 Rucho and Lewis took 
heed of what the Supreme Court instructed in prior redistricting 
litigation: majority-minority districts were not a requirement of 
compliance with the VRA,196 mentions of race as a motivator in 
redistricting could render a map unconstitutional,197 and 
partisan gerrymanders, while perhaps disfavored, were 
upheld.198 
Among the criterion Senator Rucho, Representative Lewis, 
and Dr. Hofeller cited to govern 2016 redistricting map were: 
equal population, contiguity, political data, compactness, and 
partisan advantage.199 The partisan advantages Republican 
leadership sought were specific and direct.200 During the 
redistricting process, Representative Lewis stated that he 
“proposed that [the Committee] draw the maps to give a 
partisan advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats because 
[he] d[id] not believe it . . . possible to draw a map with 11 
Republicans and 2 Democrats.”201 The 2016 redistricting map 
worked as Rucho and Lewis had hoped. In the 2016 election 
 
 195. See id. (“Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho instructed Dr. 
Hofeller ‘to change as few’ of the district lines in the 2011 Plan as possible in 
remedying the racial gerrymander.”). 
 196. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472.   
 197. See id. at 1497 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority relied 
on the references to race made by the leaders of the 2011 redistricting to find 
that race, not political behavior, was the predominant motivator for the 2011 
map).  
 198. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001) (reversing the district 
court’s finding that District 12 was a racial gerrymander and finding the 
district boundaries were drawn to achieve partisan goals); Charles & 
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 151, at 1578 (referring to partisan justifications 
for gerrymandering as a “safe harbor of sorts for the states when they [draw] 
majority-minority districts”).  
 199. See Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 807–08 (listing the criteria 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis proposed to govern the 2016 
redistricting process).  
 200. Id. at 808 (indicating that Republicans drew the district boundaries 
to achieve a specific goal of a ten-three majority). 
 201. Id. (quoting Representative Lewis).  
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Republican candidates won ten out of thirteen seats and the 
2018 election yielded almost identical results.202  
Common Cause (a non-profit organization), the North 
Carolina Democratic Party, and fourteen individual voters sued 
Rucho and Lewis to challenge the 2016 map.203 The plaintiffs 
claimed the 2016 congressional districting maps were 
“unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders” in violation of the 
First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, 
Section 2 of the Constitution.204 After a  four-day trial, the 
three-judge district court unanimously found that the 2016 map 
was a partisan gerrymander which violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and Article I of the Constitution.205 The 
majority of the panel also found that the plan violated the First 
Amendment by “retaliating against supporters of Democratic 
candidates on the basis of their political beliefs.”206 
The case reached the Supreme Court, but the Court 
remanded for a determination on whether the plaintiffs had 
standing to bring their claims.207 The district court concluded 
that the plaintiffs had standing and again found that the 2016 
maps were partisan gerrymanders in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.208 
 
 202. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491–92 (2019) (noting that 
in the 2018 election the Republican party initially won ten seats, but that the 
N.C. State Board of Elections called for a new election in one of those districts 
after allegations of fraud).  
 203. See id. at 2492 (describing the procedural history of this case). 
Plaintiffs from Maryland brought similar claims based on the Maryland 
congressional map, which were consolidated with the North Carolina claims. 
Id. For the sake of continuity, this Note will examine only the North Carolina 
claims, although the Court’s reasoning on justiciability applies to both.  
 204. Id. at 2491. 
 205. Id. at 2492 (citing Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 
(M.D.N.C. 2018)). 
 206. Id.  
 207. See id. (citing Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d. 777 
(M.D.N.C. 2018)).  
 208. See id. (“On the merits, the court found that ‘the General Assembly’s 
predominant intent was to discriminate against voters who supported or were 
likely to support non-Republican candidates,’ and to ‘entrench Republican 
candidates’ through widespread cracking and packing of Democratic voters.” 
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However, when the case returned to the Supreme Court, the 
Court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.209 In 
Rucho, for the first time, the Court was able to assemble a 
majority on the issue of whether partisan gerrymandering is 
justiciable in the federal courts.210 Ultimately, the Court 
answered this questioning in the negative, holding that partisan 
gerrymandering is not justiciable in federal court.211 
To reach its conclusion, the Court applied the political 
question doctrine, which limits the federal courts to deciding 
only Article III “Cases” and “Controversies”212 that are judicial 
in nature.213 Under the political question doctrine, issues that 
are “entrusted to one of the political branches or [involve] no 
judicially enforceable rights”214 are beyond the jurisdictional 
reach of the federal courts.215 “Among the political question 
cases the Court has identified are those that lack ‘judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
[them].’”216 According to the majority, claims of partisan 
gerrymandering fall within this category.217 
 
(quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d. 777, 883–84 (M.D.N.C. 
2018))). 
 209. Id. at 2491 (conceding that the maps at issue were highly partisan 
but stating that the issue was whether the lower courts had “appropriately 
exercised [their] judicial power when they found them unconstitutional”).  
 210. See id. at 2506–07 (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering 
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”); 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(assembling only a four-justice plurality holding that partisan 
gerrymandering lacks judicially manageable standards). 
 211. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07 (holding that partisan 
gerrymandering is beyond the reach of the federal courts).  
 212. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
 213. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2493–94 (2019).  
 214. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277.  
 215. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (explaining that political questions are 
“outside the courts’ competence and therefore beyond the courts’ jurisdiction” 
(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))).  
 216. See id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  
 217. See id. at 2507 (“Federal judges have no license to reallocate political 
power between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of 
authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their 
decisions.”). 
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The Court went on to discuss the long history of 
gerrymandering in the United States and the frustration with 
the practice dating back to the Colonial era.218 Based on that 
history the Court stated, 
The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems 
and considered what to do about them. They settled on a 
characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state 
legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal 
Congress. . . . At no point was there a suggestion that the 
federal courts had a role to play.219  
However, the Court, citing Shaw I, was careful to clarify that 
there is a role for the federal judiciary in adjudicating claims of 
racial gerrymandering.220 
The problem that the Court contended with in Rucho is that 
some level of partisan gerrymandering is justified under the 
Constitution, as opposed to OPOV violations and racial 
gerrymandering claims,221 which are always invalid.222 Rather 
than asking whether a state has engaged in partisan 
gerrymandering, the Court was asked to answer whether 
“political gerrymandering has gone too far.”223  
After discussing its attempts224 to create a standard to 
measure when “political gerrymandering has gone too far,” and 
the multitude of standards proposed by the plaintiffs and the 
 
 218. See id. at 2494–95 (describing the history of gerrymandering and 
Congress’ efforts to limit partisan gerrymandering).  
 219. Id. at 2496.  
 220. See id. at 2496–97 (noting that the federal courts may also decide 
one-person, one-vote claims under Wesbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 (1964)).  
 221. See supra Part II.  
 222. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (“[W]hile it is illegal for a jurisdiction to 
depart from the one-person, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination 
in districting, ‘a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political 
gerrymandering.’” (quoting Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999))).  
 223. See id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004) (plurality 
opinion)).  
 224. See id. at 2497–98 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); and Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 
272–73 (2004) as examples of the Court’s fractured attempts to resolve the 
issues of justiciability and develop a standard by which to adjudicate partisan 
gerrymandering).  
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dissent,225 the Court concluded that even though “[e]xcessive 
partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem 
unjust. . . . [P]artisan gerrymandering claims present political 
questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”226 After its 
many attempts to untangle the partisan and racial threads 
bound up in North Carolina’s redistricting process, the Court 
finally threw in the towel, at least with regard to the “safe 
harbor”227 of politically motivated gerrymandering.228  
Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor, warning that without a judicial check 
on partisan gerrymandering politicians will be able to “entrench 
themselves in office against voters’ preferences . . . [and] 
irreparably damage our system of government.”229 In Justice 
Kagan’s view, there are manageable standards that would allow 
judicial intervention in the “worst-of-the-worst cases of 
democratic subversion” without impermissibly interfering with 
a state’s redistricting priorities.230  
The dissent stressed that the voters—not 
politicians— should decide who is elected to serve in office.231 
Specifically, the dissent took issue with Representative Lewis’ 
statement: “I think electing Republicans is better than electing 
Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I think is 
 
 225. See id. at 2502 (rejecting a test that would require challengers to show 
a predominant purpose was to dilute the voting strength of a political party 
and that the subordination is likely to persist in subsequent elections under 
the map at issue, before allowing defendants to show another legitimate 
purpose for the districting).  
 226. Id. at 2506–07.  
 227. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 151, at 1578.  
 228. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a 
constitutional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial 
capabilities.”).  
 230. Id. at 2509, 2516 (suggesting a standard to measure partisan 
gerrymandering used by some states that “takes as its baseline a State’s own 
criteria of fairness, apart from partisan gain. And . . . requiring plaintiffs to 
make difficult showings relating to both purpose and 
effects . . . invalidates . . . only the most extreme[] partisan gerrymanders”).  
 231. See id. at 2510 (arguing that the American people should decide who 
will represent their interests).  
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better for the country.”232 More troubling still was that the plan 
worked so well—the Republican supermajorities that resulted 
from the 2016 and 2018 elections were won with only 53 percent 
and 50 percent of the state-wide vote in, respectively.233 The 
credit for this precision comes from modern technology that 
gerrymandering map-drawers of the Framers’ era could not 
have imagined, undercutting the majority’s arguments 
regarding the historical treatment of partisan 
gerrymandering.234  
The dissent went on to frame the problem that the majority 
left in its wake: the failure to provide a remedy for “grievous 
harm to democratic governance and flagrant infringements on 
individuals’ [constitutional] rights.”235 What the dissent did not 
discuss is the problem at the threshold of the North Carolina 
gerrymandering claims: where is the line between partisan and 
racial gerrymandering in the wake of Rucho? The Rucho 
decision, if left unchecked, creates the “magic words” test that 
Justice Beasley of the North Carolina Supreme Court cautioned 
in Dickson v. Rucho and that the Middle District of North 
Carolina discussed in Harris v. McCrory, allowing state 
legislatures to hide racial motivation by sanitizing the 
legislative redistricting record of references to race.236 With 
Rucho’s holding that partisan gerrymandering is nonjusticiable 
firmly in place, the stakes in the initial determination between 
racial and partisan gerrymandering become far higher, and the 
 
 232. Id. (citing Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 808 
(M.D.N.C. 2018)).  
 233. See id. at 2510–11 (characterizing the North Carolina and Maryland 
maps as “voter-proof”).  
 234. See id. at 2512–13 (“Mapmakers now have access to more granular 
data about party preference and voting behavior than ever before. . . . These 
are not your grandfather’s—let alone the Framers’—gerrymanders.”).  
 235. Id. at 2515. 
 236. See Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d. 238, 269 (N.C. 2014) (Beasley, J., 
dissenting) (“To allow this serpentine district, which follows the I-85 corridor 
between Mecklenburg and Guilford Counties, to be drafted for political 
advantage . . . creates a ‘magic words’ threshold.”); Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. 
Supp. 3d. 600, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (indicating that reliance on the 
map-drawers’ purported partisan rationale would create the “magic words” 
test warned of in Dickson (quoting Dickson, 766 S.E.2d at 269))).  
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incentive to “cry partisan” in an attempt to avoid judicial review 
becomes ever stronger.237 
V.  A Historically Informed Solution: Flowers v. Mississippi 
In order to ensure that evidence of partisanship does not 
become a shield to insulate partisan redistricting plans that 
have a strong, or even predominant, racial component from 
judicial review, the Supreme Court should develop a standard 
by which it can evaluate partisan gerrymandering challenges in 
states with histories of racial gerrymandering.238 The Court’s 
reasoning from its decision in Flowers v. Mississippi, decided six 
days prior to Rucho v. Common Cause, provides a useful starting 
point for creating a workable standard. 
Flowers was a murder case.239 Specifically, it was an appeal 
from Curtis Flowers’ sixth trial for the same crime tried by the 
same lead prosecutor.240 The first three trials resulted in 
conviction, but all three were overturned by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court due to prosecutorial misconduct in the jury 
selection process.241 In at least two of the first three trials, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court found that the prosecutor 
discriminated on the basis of race in peremptory challenges of 
Black jurors.242 The fourth and fifth trials ended in hung 
juries.243 And in the sixth trial, at issue before the Supreme 
Court, Flowers again argued that the State “violated Batson [v. 
 
 237. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2522–23 (2019) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the leaders of the North Carolina Legislature “felt 
free to openly proclaim their intent to entrench their party in office” because 
they “thought their actions could not be attacked in court”).  
 238. See supra Part III (describing the need for a threshold test before a 
claim of gerrymandering can be dismissed based on the political question 
doctrine).  
 239. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2019) (explaining 
that Curtis Flowers allegedly murdered four people in Winona, Mississippi). 
 240. Id. at 2234–35.   
 241. See id. (describing the procedural posture as this case came before the 
U.S. Supreme Court).  
 242. See id. (indicating that the prosecution had engaged in racial 
discrimination to eliminate Black jurors from jury service). 
 243. Id. at 2235.  
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Kentucky]244 in exercising peremptory strikes against Black 
prospective jurors.”245  
The Supreme Court reversed Flowers’ conviction, finding 
that the State’s pattern of striking Black potential jurors 
(forty-one out of forty-two potential jurors over the course of six 
trials), disparate questioning of Black and White potential 
jurors, and striking a particular Black juror who was similarly 
situated to a White juror justified reversal.246 In reaching their 
conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the State’s history of 
employing its “peremptory strikes to remove as many [B]lack 
perspective jurors as possible.”247 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kavanaugh stated: “The State’s actions in the first four 
trials necessarily inform our assessment of the State’s intent 
going into Flowers’ sixth trial. We cannot ignore that history. We 
cannot take that history out of the case.”248 In the majority’s 
view, the trial judge in Flowers’ case, although aware of the 
State’s history, “did not sufficiently account for the history when 
considering Flowers’ Batson claim.”249 So, less than one week 
before the decision in Rucho was handed down, the Court 
acknowledged the importance of a state’s history of racial 
discrimination to justify its finding of discrimination in the case 
 
 244. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (finding that “the 
State’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges[] is 
subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause”). Under Batson, a 
prosecutor may not strike a juror because of “their race or on the assumption 
that [B]lack jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s 
case against a [B]lack defendant.” Id.  
 245. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235.  
 246. See id. at 2251 (holding that “all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances taken together” established sufficient grounds for reversal).  
 247. See id. at 2245–46 (“[O]ur review of the history of the prosecutor’s 
peremptory strikes in Flowers’ first four trials strongly supports the 
conclusion that his use of peremptory strikes in Flowers’ sixth trial was 
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”).  
 248. Id. at 2246 (emphasis added).  
 249. Id.   
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before it.250 This reliance on history is equally applicable to the 
North Carolina gerrymandering saga.251  
The Court’s examination of a Mississippi prosecutor’s 
record of racial discrimination may seem to have little to do with 
a standard to resolve a problem related to vote dilution. 
However, there are at least two similarities. First, the injury 
claimed by Curtis Flowers has the same constitutional source as 
the injury claimed by plaintiffs in a racial or partisan 
gerrymandering case—the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.252 The Court in Flowers recognized a 
second similarity: “Other than voting, serving on a jury is the 
most substantial opportunity that most citizens have in the 
democratic process.”253 Similar democratic and constitutional 
values, therefore, are at stake.  
The majority in Flowers gave a brief history of the racial 
manipulation of jury selection pre-Batson.254 Although the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875255 and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Strauder v. West Virginia256 had long prohibited discrimination 
against potential jurors based on race, prosecutors continued to 
use their unlimited freedom to exercise peremptory strikes to 
 
 250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.  
 251. Cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (indicating that 
extraordinary protections for voting rights may be justified where there is a 
demonstrated, established, and continuing pattern of discrimination with 
regard to voting rights).  
 252. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2019) (“Under the 
Equal Protection Clause . . . even a single instance of race discrimination 
against a prospective juror is impermissible.”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 
S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the practice 
of packing and cracking voters based on race violates the Equal Protection 
Clause); Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (concluding that plaintiffs 
challenging congressional districting map as a racial gerrymander under the 
Equal Protection Clause could state a claim by showing that a facially neutral 
law cannot be explained without regard to race).  
 253. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 
(1991)) (emphasis added).  
 254. Id. at 2238–42.  
 255. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 243).  
 256. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).  
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eliminate Black jurors until the Court decided Batson in 1986.257 
The Court described the use of peremptory strikes to restrict 
potential Black jurors from jury service as a “more covert and 
less overt” method of achieving the same result—eliminating 
Black jurors from the jury panel.258  
The history of racial gerrymandering and subsequent 
transition to partisan gerrymandering discussed in Parts III 
and IV of this Note may similarly be described as a move from 
more overt racial gerrymandering to a covert method of 
achieving similar results through race-conscious, but not 
facially race-motivated partisan gerrymandering.259 In the same 
way an individual prosecutor can obscure racial bias behind 
peremptory strikes,260 state legislatures can hide a racially 
discriminatory purpose or effect behind language and reasoning 
that emphasizes partisanship over race.261 These similar 
degradations of the rights of people of color in the United States 
warrant similar treatment.262 The Supreme Court could and 
should follow its logic from Flowers and consider a state’s recent 
and long-standing history of racial gerrymandering when 
confronted with the defense that gerrymandering is based on 
partisan, rather than racial, motivations.263 
One method of taking that history into account would be to 
create a presumption of racial gerrymandering applicable to 
 
 257. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238–42 (indicating that after Strauder 
held a West Virginia law forbidding people of color from service as jurors 
unconstitutional, prosecutors were able to use peremptory strikes to achieve 
the same result).  
 258. Id. at 2240. 
 259. See supra Parts III, IV.  
 260. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2240 (explaining that prosecutors’ use of 
peremptory challenges put discrimination behind the courthouse doors).  
 261. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 151, at 1585; cf. Cooper v. 
Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1486 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Cromartie II imposed 
a requirement that individuals challenging a congressional map put forth an 
alternative map that would achieve the same partisan balance without any 
racial effect).  
 262. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.  
 263. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246 (discussing the lower court’s failure to 
consider the history of the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes in evaluating 
Flowers’ claim of a Batson violation).  
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states with a history of racial gerrymandering.264 The 
presumption would function as follows: First, the challengers to 
a district map would present evidence that the state has a 
history of past racial gerrymandering, thereby establishing a 
prima facie case for racial gerrymandering.265 The 
state-defendant would be required to overcome that 
presumption by putting forth evidence that partisanship was 
not a pretext for race, in purpose or effect, before a federal court 
could decline to hear the case based on the decision in Rucho.266  
The use of presumptions is not new or novel to the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence.267 This type of test is reminiscent of the 
approach the Supreme Court takes in adjudicating violations of 
 
 264. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 642–44 (1993) (creating a presumption of 
invalidity where a congressional districting plan is motivated by race); see also 
Pitts, supra note 8, at 261–62 (suggesting that “under the right circumstances, 
racial gerrymandering doctrine could curb partisan gerrymandering . . . [by 
making] a redistricting actor . . . less inclined to engage in partisan 
gerrymandering just knowing that . . . [the racial gerrymandering doctrine] is 
available to his or her political opponents”).  
 265. Cf. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) 
(describing the burden of establishing a prima facie case in employment 
discrimination law suits as “not onerous,” requiring plaintiff to show “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for 
which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise 
to unlawful discrimination”).  
 266. Cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 170–71 (2015) (shifting the 
burden to the defendant-town to put forth evidence that a content-based 
regulation on speech was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state 
interest in order to defeat a presumption of invalidity for content-based 
regulations under the First Amendment).  
 267. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–66 (1996) 
(stating that the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses can be dispelled by clear and convincing 
evidence that the prosecution was motivated by race or other improper 
purpose); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (explaining that after 
plaintiffs prove their prima facie case for racial discrimination, the burden 
shifts to defendants to rebut the presumption of constitutional invalidity); 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (“Establishment of the prima facie case . . . creates a 
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the 
employee. If the [factfinder] believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and if the 
employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter 
judgment for the plaintiff . . . .”).  
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the Equal Protection Clause based on racial discrimination.268 
Such an approach is justified because, if challengers are able to 
make a showing that a map drawn to achieve ostensibly 
partisan goals has the purpose or effect of diluting the voting 
strength of minority voters, the claim ceases to be one based on 
partisanship and becomes a claim of racial discrimination under 
the Equal Protection Clause.269   
This test would allow prospective plaintiffs to bring a claim 
in federal court alleging racial gerrymandering and to support 
that claim with a description of the state’s history of 
race-motivated redistricting. If the state-defendant then 
attempted to argue that the case should be dismissed by alleging 
a partisan purpose under Rucho, it would first have to overcome 
a presumption that the classification was based on race rather 
than party affiliation.270 Drawing from the Batson-Flowers 
reasoning, a defendant should not overcome the presumption by 
the mere assertion that there is a correlation between race and 
party affiliation.271 Rather, under this test, the state-defendant 
would be required to put forth a record that is justifiable, in light 
of the state’s history, with priorities other than manipulation of 
the racial composition of districts.272  
 
 268. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642–44 (stating that government actions that 
discriminate based on race, either facially or in purpose and effect, are 
presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection Clause).  
 269. See id. at 645 (“[D]istrict lines . . . drawn for the purpose of separating 
voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption.”).  
 270. Cf. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 151, at 1580 (arguing that 
attempting to divine whether redistricting was based on race or partisanship 
is “quixotic at best” due to the high correlation between race and party 
affiliation).  
 271. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2241 (2019) (“[A] 
prosecutor may not rebut a claim of discrimination ‘by stating merely that he 
challenged jurors of the defendant’s race on the assumption . . . that they 
would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.’” (quoting 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986))); Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, 
supra note 151, at 1580 (“[I]n our modern era, race and partisanship are highly 
correlated.”). 
 272. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241 (stating that Batson does not allow a 
prosecutor to escape judicial scrutiny for peremptory strikes of Black jurors 
based on an assumption that such jurors would not impartially evaluate a case 
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The Flowers Court’s use of history is instructive in the 
application of the test this Note proposes. As previously 
discussed, Flowers, Rucho, and the long line of cases preceding 
Rucho were brought under the Equal Protection Clause.273 
Therefore, the use of history and practice in evaluating such a 
claim is not foreign to the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
analysis and, just as in the case of peremptory strikes, the 
historical background surrounding a state’s record of 
redistricting challenges should not be ignored.274  
Additionally, a test tying a state’s voting rights history 
together with a presumption of racial gerrymandering would 
not upset the existing jurisprudence governing voting rights. As 
was discussed in Part II of this Note, the Supreme Court refused 
to uphold the coverage formula under Section 4 of the VRA in 
Shelby County v. Holder because, while the formula had been 
justified by racial discrimination in the pre-1965 history of the 
Act, Congress had not provided recent history supporting a 
continued need for disparate treatment of different states with 
regards to voting legislation.275 However, as the case study 
presented in Part III of this Note exhibits, there is not only a 
long-standing history of racial discrimination in North 
Carolina,276 the last quarter century is rife with examples of 
racial gerrymandering, in addition to race-conscious partisan 
gerrymandering.277 Applying the Court’s logic in Shelby County 
 
with a Black defendant (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986))); 
see also Parsons, supra note 31, at 1164 (listing “compactness, contiguity, and 
respect for political subdivisions and geographic boundaries” as “neutral” 
redistricting criteria).  
 273. See cases cited supra note 252 and accompanying text.  
 274. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246 (stressing the importance of the history 
surrounding this case in reaching a conclusion).  
 275. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (indicating that 
pre-1965 discrimination alone did not justify the coverage formula subjecting 
different states to different treatment under the VRA).  
 276. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) (taking note of the evidence 
presented by the State of North Carolina of a “long history of official racial 
discrimination in North Carolina’s political system and of pervasive racial bloc 
voting”).   
 277. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82 (2017) (finding 
that North Carolina’s Congressional Districts 1 and 12 were racial 
gerrymanders).  
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to a test that considers both recent and entrenched racial 
discrimination in redistricting is, thus, not at odds with the 
Court’s decision in that case.278 
Additionally, a presumption of racial gerrymandering 
based on a state’s history does not disturb Rucho’s holding. The 
majority in Rucho was clear in acknowledging that the federal 
courts have a role in adjudicating claims of racial 
gerrymandering.279 The Rucho majority rejected tests to 
determine when partisan gerrymandering goes too far,280 but 
did not speak to federal courts’ ability to make a distinction 
between racial gerrymanders and partisan gerrymanders.281 
Practically, the Rucho decision necessitates a determination 
that gerrymandering is in fact based on partisan advantage and 
not race.282 Applying the presumption of racial gerrymandering 
to the facts at issue in Rucho with an eye toward North 
Carolina’s deeply rooted history of racial gerrymandering283 
would have forced the Supreme Court to engage with all that 
was at stake in Rucho and to make a definitive determination 
that partisanship was not a cloak to obscure a racially 
discriminatory purpose.284  
 
 278. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557 (“Our country has changed [since 
the VRA was enacted in 1965], and while any racial discrimination in voting 
is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy 
that problem speaks to current conditions.”). This Note takes no position on 
whether Shelby County was correctly decided; it merely notes that the 
framework proposed in this Note is consistent with the Court’s decision.  
 279. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2488 (2019) (stating 
that claims of racial gerrymandering are subject to federal judicial review).  
 280. See id. at 2502 (rejecting balancing tests that attempted to determine 
acceptable levels of partisanship).  
 281. See id. at 2498 (indicating that partisan gerrymanders are 
nonjusticiable because it would be inappropriate for the federal courts to 
interfere with the political process).   
 282. See Ely, supra note 5, at 498 (asserting that partisan and racial 
motivations for gerrymandering are often “inextricably intertwined”).  
 283. See cases cited supra note 6 (displaying North Carolina’s record of 
racial and partisan gerrymandering challenges over the past quarter century).  
 284. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If left 
unchecked, gerrymanders like the ones here may irreparably damage our 
system of government.”).  
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A. The Test Applied to the Facts of Rucho v. Common Cause 
Rucho began with the Middle District of North Carolina’s 
decision, which recounted a detailed history of the racial and 
partisan gerrymandering claims in North Carolina.285 In 
particular, the opinion focused on the instructions 
Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho gave Dr. Hofeller to 
guide him in drawing the remedial plan, after the Supreme 
Court struck down the 2011 plan in Cooper as a racial 
gerrymander.286 The instructions, which were given orally and 
never reduced to a writing, boiled down to two main points: (1) 
Dr. Hofeller was to use granular political data to maintain the 
partisan distribution in the State’s congressional delegation of 
ten Republicans and three Democrats and; (2) he was to 
“‘change as few’ of the district lines in the 2011 Plan as possible 
in remedying the racial gerrymander.”287 The Middle District of 
North Carolina’s opinion also noted that—pursuant to the 2016 
Rucho-Lewis-Hofeller plan—both District 1 and District 12 
retained at least 50 percent of the population as in their 
corresponding 2011 racially gerrymandered version.288  
The Supreme Court in Rucho thus had evidence before it 
that the primary drafter of the challenged map successfully 
 
 285. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 801–03 (M.D.N.C. 
2018) (“Over the last 30 years, North Carolina voters repeatedly have asked 
state and federal courts to pass judgment on the constitutionality of the 
congressional districting plans drawn by their state legislators.”).  
 286. See id. at 803–08 (detailing the process Rucho, Lewis, and Hofeller 
used to effectuate the 2016 map); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82 
(2017) (labeling the 2011 redistricting plan a racial gerrymander with respect 
to Districts 1 and 12).  
 287. See Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 805 (“Representative Lewis 
and Senator Rucho further instructed Dr. Hofeller that he should use that 
political data to draw a map that would maintain the existing partisan 
makeup of the state’s congressional delegation, which, [w]as elected under the 
racially gerrymandered [2011] plan . . . .”). 
 288. See id. at 809  
In accordance with the Chairs [sic] goals of protecting incumbents 
and preserving the “cores” of the districts in the 2011 [racially 
gerrymandered] plan, 10 of the 13 districts (Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 10, and 12) in the 2016 Plan retain[ed] at least 50 percent of the 
population in their corresponding 2011 version. (emphasis added). 
Supra note 174 and accompanying text.  
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followed instructions to keep as much of the racially 
gerrymandered 2011 map in place as possible.289 In addition, 
recently revealed files from Dr. Hofeller’s computer, which he 
used to draw the map challenged in Rucho, demonstrate that 
race was considered in drawing the district lines.290 Specifically, 
Dr. Hofeller’s files show that he created detailed maps that 
“tracked race, voting patterns and addresses of tens of 
thousands of North Carolina college students” in conjunction 
with the 2016 redistricting plan.291 These files also show that a 
congressional district line was drawn to divide North Carolina 
A&T State University, the nation’s largest historically Black 
college, in half “so precisely that it all but guarantees it will be 
represented in Congress by two Republicans for years to 
come.”292  
Had the Rucho Court started with a presumption of racial 
gerrymandering, this evidence would likely have been sufficient 
for the Court to uphold that presumption, even in the face of the 
State’s evidence that the map was governed by race-neutral 
partisan districting principles.293 Thus, under this test the 2016 
map would have been subject to the strict racial gerrymandering 
analysis established by the cases discussed in Part III of this 
 
 289. See Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 805 (describing the overlap 
between the 2011 racially gerrymandered plan and the 2016 plan drawn for 
partisan advantage).  
 290. See David Daley, The Secret Files of the Master of Modern Republican 
Gerrymandering, NEW YORKER (Sept. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/C6XY-RP97 
(discussing the information obtained by the New Yorker from Dr. Hofeller’s 
emails and computer files).  
 291. Id.   
 292. Id. 
 293. See Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 807–08 (indicating that the 
Republicans’ stated criteria governing the 2016 redistricting plan were limited 
to: equal population, contiguity, political data, partisan advantage, 
compactness, incumbency, and eliminating the snake-like quality of District 
12); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[A] governing political coalition has an incentive to prevent 
changes in the existing balance of voting power. When voting is racially 
polarized, efforts by the ruling party to pursue that incentive ‘will inevitably 
discriminate against a racial group.’” (quoting Stephen Ansolabehere et al., 
Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: 
Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 209 (2013))). 
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Note, rather than being dismissed as a political question.294 
Such analysis would have prompted the Court to probe deeper 
into the intentions of the map-drawers to ensure the 2016 plan 
did not compromise minority voters’ constitutional rights.295 
VI. Conclusion 
The Rucho decision prohibits the federal judiciary from 
adjudicating potential violations of a fundamental 
constitutional right.296 The majority in Rucho suggests that the 
solution to extreme partisan gerrymanders may lie with state 
constitutions, legislatures, and judiciaries.297 Specifically, the 
majority lauded states that have implemented nonpartisan 
redistricting commissions.298 However, when the rubber meets 
the road, there are practical challenges to the implementation 
of such commissions.299 Chief among those challenges is that 
asking a party in power to enact a law establishing a 
nonpartisan redistricting commission is asking individual 
politicians and political parties to act against their own 
 
 294. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2505–06 (2019) 
(holding that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question).  
 295. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[Voting may be 
regarded as] a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all 
rights.”). 
 296. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the 
gerrymanders at issue in the case as violating “the most fundamental” of the 
challengers’ constitutional rights).  
 297. See id. at 2507 (majority opinion) (describing the various ways in 
which states have addressed excessive partisanship in their redistricting 
plans); see also Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super. 
LEXIS 56, at *413–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019) (striking down the map 
that was at issue in Rucho under the North Carolina Constitution’s voting 
protections, which the court found to be more stringent than the federal 
constitutional protections). Although the North Carolina State courts found 
that the map at issue in Rucho violated the State constitution, the issue 
presented and analyzed by this Note, namely the potential shield from federal 
judicial review, remains unaddressed. 
 298. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (stating that the Court’s decision “does 
not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering” and suggesting that states 
restrict partisan power in the redistricting process through legislation).   
 299. See infra note 301 and accompanying text. 
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interests.300 This very tension between long-term electoral 
fairness and short-term partisan advantage is playing out in 
Virginia,301 another state with a history of racial 
gerrymandering.302 
Although it appears clear that the electorate cannot trust 
politicians to police themselves, Rucho is the law of the land for 
the foreseeable future.303 As such, the issue presented by this 
Note is vital to ensuring that a “magic words” test does not 
dilute the voting strength of minority citizens and subsequently 
 
 300. See Parsons, supra note 31, at 1136–37 (arguing that partisanship is 
a personal interest of politicians and political parties, rather than a state 
interest for the purpose of constitutional analysis).  
 301. See Laura Vozzella, Some Virginia Democrats Want to Hit the Brakes 
on Nonpartisan Redistricting Plan, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2019, 12:32 PM), 
https://perma.cc/ATA6-EVZL (“With their party in control of the State House 
and Senate for the first time in a generation, [Democratic] opponents of [the 
redistricting commission] are feeling empowered and saying they want to hit 
the brakes.”); Gregory S. Schneider, Virginians to Vote on Proposed 
Amendment for Bipartisan Redistricting Commission, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 
2020, 3:26 PM), https://perma.cc/X9QD-QUGU (noting that the Virginia 
Democratic Party, which currently holds the majority of seats in the Virginia 
General Assembly, officially opposes the ballot measure that would create a 
nonpartisan redistricting panel); Robert McCartney, Virginia Democrats Face 
Choice Between Idealism and Revenge in Vote on Gerrymandering, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 5, 2020 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/GF8R-DB8N (quoting Virginia House 
of Delegates member Marcia S. “Cia” Price (D-Newport News) as saying 
“[Instituting a nonpartisan redistricting committee] would not be the first 
time or only issue where Democrats are called suckers”). “The Democrats’ 
temptation to keep all the power for themselves is strengthened by their 
awareness that the Republicans did not hesitate to wield theirs to maximum 
advantage following the last two censuses, especially after 2010.” Id. Virginia 
voters ultimately approved an amendment to the state constitution creating a 
bipartisan redistricting commission. Rachel Weiner, Virginians Approve 
Turning Redistricting Over to Bipartisan Commission, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 
2020, 9:59 AM), https://perma.cc/9AXF-8FC8.  
 302. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d 
128, 137 (E.D. Va. 2018) (holding that “race predominated over traditional 
districting factors in the construction” of eleven challenged districts and that 
the Virginia legislature’s use of race was not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest).   
 303. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (“Partisan gerrymandering rests on an 
instinct that groups with a certain level of political support should enjoy a 
commensurate level of political power and influence.”); Vonzella, supra note 
301 (implying that the party in power will seek to hold that power).  
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obscure that dilution from judicial scrutiny.304 In states with 
histories of racial gerrymandering, this concern is even more 
pressing.305 The solution presented in this Note places an 
additional layer of protection between claims of non-justiciable 
partisan gerrymandering and the history of racial subjugation 
that often lies beneath, and therefore prevents Rucho from 
opening the door to repetition of an unjust history.306   
 
 
 304. But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (“Nor 
does our conclusion [that partisan gerrymandering presents a nonjusticiable 
political question] condemn complaints about districting to echo into a void.”).  
 305. See supra Part V (arguing that a state’s history of racial 
gerrymandering provides vital context to a claim of partisan gerrymandering).  
 306. See supra Part V.   
